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PIEture 
Frames' 
I Pictures-in the sense of still photographs-can be divided into two classes, private and public. 
Private pictures are those designed for display within the 
intimate social circle of the persons featured in them-
pictures taken (with or without recourse to a professional 
photographer) in order to commemorate occasions, relation-
ships, achievements, and life-turning points, whether of a 
familial or organizational kind. 
The special properties of private pictures as part of our 
domestic ceremonial life are worth considering, and this can 
be done best, perhaps, by starting with ceremony and 
working to pictures. 
Ritual and ceremonial involve portraiture, involve making 
palpable to the senses what might otherwise remain buried 
and tacit in the structure of social life. The traditional 
argument is that these enactments function to reaffirm basic 
social arrangements and ultimate beliefs regarding man and 
nature. 
Ritual and ceremonial are accomplished through doings-
through making appearances, taking up microecological 
positions relative to others, performing gestures- and in the 
nature of doings are soon, if not quickly, completed or 
played out. (Duration can vary anywhere from the micro-
second taken to administer a smile to the six weeks required 
for the most obdurate of festivities.) As such, these acts can 
be distinguished from another class of devices which also 
help (albeit in a very small way) to maintain us in felt 
support of our social structure: souvenirs, mementoes, gifts, 
commemoratives, and other rei ics. These objects, ofttimes 
directly a part of what it is they celebrate, just as often 
poorly portray these celebrated social arrangements. But 
since objects are involved, not actions, things, not enact-
ments, they can last a long time-in the relevant sense 
forever. 
Consider now the pictorial arts. A feature of drawings, 
paintings, sculpture, and especially photographs, is that these 
artifacts allow for a combination of ritual and relic. The 
rendition of structurally important social arrangements and 
ultimate beliefs which ceremony fleetingly provides the 
senses, still photography can further condense, omitting 
temporal sequence and everything else except static visual 
arrays. And what is caught is fixed into permanent accessi-
1
1 have benefited from harsh criticism and a great number of 
useful suggestions from Sol Worth; also, in a general way, from 
Goodman (1968}. 
bility, becoming something that can be attended anywhere, 
for any length of time, and at moments of one's own 
choosing. 
Thus it is in modern times-and as the modern contribu-
tion to ceremonial life-that whenever there is a wedding, an 
investiture, a birthday party, a graduation exercise, an 
extended voyage begun or terminated, a picnic, a shop 
opening, a vacation, or even a visit, snapshots may well be 
taken, developed, and the prints kept easy to hand. 2 
Something like self-worship can thus be accomplished. The 
individual is able to catch himself at a moment when-for 
him-he is in ideal surroundings, in association with socially 
desirable others, garbed in a self-enhancing way (which for 
white-collar men may mean the rough and manly wear of 
fishermen, hunters, wranglers, or machinists), poised for a 
promising take-off, terminating an important engagement, 
and with a socially euphoric look on his face. A moment 
when what is visible about him attests to social matters about 
which he is proud. A moment, in short, when he is in social 
bloom, ready, therefore, to accept his appearance as a 
typification of himself. 3 This moment he can dry-freeze and 
hang on the walls of his house, his office, his shop, his locker, 
and his wallet, a reference point to which he can return time 
and again (and long after he can no longer live the scene) as 
testimonial, as evidence, as depiction, of what his best social 
self has been and, by implication, must still be. A modest 
pact with the devil: the individual can shift the ravages of 
time from his triumphant appearances to his current ones, 
the only cost being to have slightly spoiled involvement in 
these former scenes, these high points, consequent on the 
postural reframing distractively induced by either the 
immanent prospect of being snapped or the mechanics of 
doing the snapping or (with Polaroid) a viewing of the 
viewing. 
II Public pictures are those designed to catch a wider audience-an anonymous aggregate of individuals uncon-
nected to one another by social relationship and social 
interaction, although falling within the same market or the 
same political jurisdiction, the same outreaches of appeal. 
Here a photographic print is usually not the final form, only 
a preliminary step in some type of photo-mechanical 
reproduction in newspapers, magazines, books, leaflets, or 
posters. 
Public pictures themselves are diverse in function and 
character. For example, there are commercial pictures 
2 During the recent European wars, military personnel of all ranks 
seemed drawn to photographic portraiture in dress uniform-a 
commonality of ritual orientation that cut across nations and 
alliances. Why? To provide a memorial image that might well turn out 
to be the last one? (But then why not in civvies?} To bolster a social 
identity newly minted and therefore shaky? To mark the occasion of 
elevation to one's current military rank, whatever that happened to 
be? Or is the wearing of a uniform that neatly identifies one's 
situation in life to all viewers (at a time when one suddenly finds 
oneself in a situation that can be neatly identified} already a kind of 
portraiture, whose reproduction then momentarily reestablishes 
protraiture in its normal role? 
3 A similar argument concerning the content of home movies may 
be found in Chalfen (1975 :95-97}. 
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designed to sell a product for an advertiser. 
There are news photos, involving matters held to be of 
current scientific, social, and political concern. 
There are instructional pictures, as found, say, in medical 
text books, the figures in them intended to be anonymous, 
serving only (apparently) as illustrations of what can be 
visited on man. (In fact, many illustrations, including the line 
drawings in dictionaries, are also typificat ions, a variable 
mixture unadmittedly responsive to preconceptions concern-
ing the average, the essential, and the ideal.) 
There are human interest pictures, also anonymous, 
oftti mes candid, in which otherwise unnoteworthy individ-
uals confirm our doctrine of expression by eloquently (and 
presumably unintendedly) choreographing some response, 
such as fear, puzzlement, surprise, love, shyness, or some 
inner state, such as joy, hopelessness, innocence, or how we 
look and what we do when we think no one is present to 
observe us. To which must be added scenes that a well-placed 
camera can compose into some sort of "aesthetic" design or 
into a conventionally evocative portrait of nature. All of 
these pictured scenes can hopefully be viewed as ends in 
themselves, timeless, and arty. (In this domain, observe, the 
line between private and public can waver.4 Countless 
enthusiasts are encouraged by a mass hobby apparatus to 
invest in serious photographic equipment, acquire profession-
al techniques, and take non-family pictures styled for 
hanging in a gallery. Although only friends and relatives of 
the household are likely to view the results, in principle they 
do so "critically" in their capacity as anonymous members of 
the wider public. And should a larger stage be offered the 
amateur, the occasion is likely to be seized as recognition, 
not avoided as an invasion of privacy.) 
Finally, there are personal publicity pictures, ones 
designed to bring before the public a flattering portrait of 
some luminary, whether politicaV religious, military, sport-
ing, theatrical, literary, 6 or- where a class elite still functions 
and is publicized- social. 
Involved here are actual or putative leadership and 
symbolization of some structure or hierarchy or value 
presentable as central to society. Note, the publicity function 
extends far beyond personal publicity shots, seeping into 
almost every kind of picture. Commercial pictures often link 
a product to a celebrity, selling them both. The pictorial 
record made of important public ceremonies necessarily gives 
4
For this and other suggestions, I am grateful to Dorothea 
Hurvich. 
5 
A deft discussion of political portraits is Roland Barthes' 
"Photography and Electoral Appeal" (1972:91-93). 
6 
For male novelists pictured on the back of their dust covers, 
this means (currently) rough, open shirts, tousled hair, youthful, virile 
appearance, and often a brooding look, this last bespeaking the deep 
thoughts that are proper to the innards of the species. Male poets may 
feel obliged to appear even more feeling. Nonfiction writers also 
present pictures of themselves as part of the merchandising of their 
product, but their posing suggests more the steady march of thought 
than the psychic cost of so directly addressing the human condition. 
Interestingly, even those who publish slashing analyses of advertising 
find reason to allow their pictures to appear on the jacket in a posture 
calculated to confirm that qualities of the book are to be seen in 
qualities of the appearance of the writer, thus promoting a folk 
theory of expression along with their books and themselves. 
personal publicity to those who officiate. News events are 
very often presented through the words and presence of 
political leaders, a write-up of the first accompanied by a 
picture of the second. Human interest shots have more 
interest if they involve famous subjects. Even the celebrity's 
personal-life rituals can be publicized as a means of affirming 
in everyone's life what is being affirmed in his own, so that 
whatever his particular domain, he will tend to become a 
public performer of private ceremonies and have extra reason 
on such occasions for taking pictures and ensuring that they 
are good ones-a mutual contamination of public and private 
which comes to a head in fan magazines. In the limiting case 
of a social elite, mere attendance at a particular social 
function or mere visiting of a particular place can qualify as 
newsworthy, these performers being empowered to 
transform social participation from routine into ritual. A 
reminder that every undertaking has a sacred element and 
can be done in circumstances which realize its hierarchical 
potential. Here, may I add, the British Royal Family is the 
modern creative force, leading the civilized world in know-
how for the mass production of personal publicity. 
Celebrities not only link their own private lives to the 
public domain, but also can link the lives of private persons 
to it. For persons in the pub I ic eye representing something of 
value and concern to many-persons possessing regional or 
national renown-seem to acquire as one of their powers the 
capacity to be a contagious high point. Politicians, sports 
stars, entertainers, and other notables qualify. In contrast to 
pictures of Jesus, Lenin, and the British Royal Family, those 
of ordinary celebrities are not always likely to carry enough 
ritual impact to warrant a place on · the mantel; nonetheless, 
celebrities need but pose for a picture in the company of a 
member of their public to manufacture a memento for him, 
one that speaks to his ideal attributes, a sort of elevation by 
photographically attested association. Note that a personal 
inscription can function as a weak substitute for joint 
appearance. 7 (In exchange for their endorsement, then, 
celebrities acquire a small billboard, rent free .) Thus in bars, 
restaurants, drycleaning establishments, and offices, these 
trophies jostle with family pictures, the latter being trophies, 
too, for they attest to the domestic property (and domestic 
piety) of the establishment's proprietor, which property, 
incidentally, has also been photographed in ideal circum-
stances. 
In all of this, note, photographic portraiture represents a 
rather significant social invention, for, even apart from its 
role in domestic ritual, it has come to provide a low and very 
little guarded point in the barrier that both protects and 
restrains persons of private life from passing over into public 
recognition. 
Ill To consider photographs- private and public- it is necessary, apparently, to consider the question of 
perception and reality, and it is necessary to control 
7 
American presidents have the distinction (one of their few) of 
having circulated inscribed pictures in their pre-election capacity, and 
after election circulating ones that qualify as hangable without an 
inscription. 
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somehow the systematic ambiguities that characterize our 
everday talk about pictures. 
(1) Pictures comprise the class of two-dimensional images 
that have been processed into fixed form, the chief examples 
being drawings, paintings, photographs, and, of course, 
letterpress reproductions of them all. (What Narcissus saw 
was a reflection, not a photograph.) A "real" or "actual" 
photograph consists of a piece of stiff, emulsified paper 
containing marks and shadings on one side, a text providing 
us with an image that has been processed photographically, 
not some other way. (Obviously, a photograph does not 
embody objects that it pictures-as Sol Worth remarks, a 
picture of fire is not hot- although some might want to say 
that the exposed surface does embody a perspectival trans-
formation of some of the relationships within the scene upon 
which the camera focused.) By this definition it follows that 
a photograph that has been "touched up," miscaptioned, or 
even doctored is still a real one. The realness of a photograph 
would only figure when, say, there was a concern to prevent 
it from getting crumpled, soiled or torn, or to control the 
effect of the texture of a paper stock upon depth perception, 
or to discover that what appeared to be a photograph was 
indeed a cleverly disguised realistic painting. (What is only 
something else and not really a photograph involves a slightly 
different, and certainly lesser, issue than that of what is not 
really something else but only a photograph. For there are 
lots of flat, papery things that a photograph can replicate-
whether or not with intent to deceive- dollar bills, water 
colors, and cardiograms being examples; indeed, with 
experimental controls a photograph pasted into a window 
can be mistaken for a three dimensional real scene. 8 ) 
· Consideration of what is a "real" picture leads to a 
consideration of what is the "same" picture, and thus 
to a version of the type-token issue. We speak of the 
"same" or "identical" picture when referring to two 
quite different possibilities: two like prints from the 
self-same negative, and two meetings-up with the 
self-same print. I don't think this particular ambiguity 
causes trouble; in any case, unlike the situation with 
coins, here terminology is ready to hand any time we 
need to specify. 
I believe that the significant question, and one that 
everyday use and terminology does obscure, is not what 
a photograph is, or what would count as the same 
photograph, but what a particular photograph is of- a 
concern, incidentally, that allows one to treat a 
8
1t is worth noting that art historians who compare various forms 
of representation- etchings, woodcuts, drawings, paintings, photo-
graphs-and use illustrations in their books to ex plicate the 
differences, tend to treat the ground of their own operation , 
letterpress graphics, as something to be taken for granted, something 
without constraining characteristics of its own , in this following the 
lay framing practice of treating the medium in which one is oneself 
working as limitless and featureless. 
9 
A close issue here. Apart from the question of permanency, a 
camera can take an instantaneous picture that contains vastly more 
detail, shading, and breadth than the eye can capture in the same 
length of time, the eye being restricted apparently to flitting about 
taking spot checks which the brain then edits and composes 
accordingly. However, before the camera's pictures (once developed 
and printed) can be of any final use, an eye must view it, and that 
photograph and its printing press reproduction as the 
same. 
Somehow we learn to decode small, flat tracings for large, 
three dimensional scenes in a manner som~what cor-
responding to the way we have learned to interpret our visual 
images of real objects. (Because a photograph has nearly 
perfect geometric perspective-sa~ing one taken, for example, 
with a distorting wide-angle lens- it is very like the image 
projected on the retina of one eye, were the retina to be 
blocked from its usual scanning; but retinal images 
themselves are systematically modified by constancy scaling 
based on additional depth cues drawn in part from stereo-
scopic and parallax-motion effects which photography must 
do without.) 9 Here the point is not that our use of our eyes 
and our pictures has had to be learned, or that this learning 
draws deeply and fallibly on past experience with the world 
in all sensory modalities (allowing us to make effective use of 
small cues and good hypotheses as to which of a set of 
possible states is to be judged the actual one), but that it 
does ge~ learned (in our society), rendering the eyeing of live 
scenes, and of pictures of scenes, efficacious and more or less 
equivalent. And note, this deciphering competency that we 
acquire with respect to live scenes, and pictures of scenes, 
does not make us acute about just any set of perceptual 
details, but rather those which allow us to make 
conventionally important discriminations; for it is about 
these matters that are of general social relevance that we will 
have bothered to accumulate experience. 1 0 Perhaps, then, 
the primary difference between an interpretation of a live 
view and an interpretation of a picture of it is that live 
viewing ordinarily assures that what is seen is as it appears 
now, whereas a picture, at best, guarantees that it was once 
so. 
In sum, one can say that, as a result of acquired 
interpretive competence, things (or rather aspects of things) 
in effect are as they seem to be seen, and as they seem to be 
pictured, notwithstanding the fact that the actual image on 
the retina and on the photographic paper is a somewhat 
different matter. And one should be able to say that a 
photograph in effect can provide us with an objective, 
veridical version- an "actual picture of' socially important 
aspects of what is in fact out there. 
However, these conclusions drawn from the psychology of 
perception fail to tell us why there should be so much doubt 
and concern among students as to what in fact photographs 
do represent. The ·frame-theoretical issue of the various 
viewing will suffer all the limits of the eye compared to the camera 
plus an extra set, namely, the limitation of having to start with a 
photograph, not the real thing. 
10The framework of experience required in order to interpret 
some photographs (such as those taken of missile sites, elementary 
particle pathways, minor meteors) may be so restricted that a lay 
person might not even be able to see what he is seeing when it is 
pointed out. However, valid perception is not a question of votes but 
of competence, W. I. Thomas notwithstanding. And that is not to say 
that viewers somehow read beyond the "simple" physical images that 
are "given" them; for a physicalistic, "objective," "literal" description 
is itself, of course, interpretive, having to be learned, too- a fact quite 
independent of how common this learning is. There are no naked 
facts, merely various types of inferential elaboration, but that is not 
to say that inferences, common or otherwise, are necessarily arbitrary. 
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senses in which pictures are said to be true, real, valid, 
candid, realistic, expressive, or, contrariwise false faked 
posed, unfaithful, doctored, guyed, still rem~ins o~en, and 
social, not psychological, answers must be sought. The easy 
sense of the man in the street that the meaning of pictures is 
clear enough comes from an easy willingness to avoid 
thinking about the meanings of meaning. 
(2) It is clear that an artist can execute a drawing or 
painting from memory and imagination, processsing an image 
of, say, a person who is no more or even never was. One 
might say that the result was a picture of a subject (or 
"figure"), not meaning to imply by this "of" that the subject 
is now, or ever was, real. Subjects belong to very human 
realms of being but not always to the current, real world. A 
subject, note, may be a building or a landscape or a stag at 
bay or the crossing of the Delaware; it can also be a person, 
the chief concern here. (French in this regard is clearer than 
English: a special reference for the word personnage 
designates a member of the fictional realm, the term 
personne being reserved for designating a member of ours.) 
Now it happens that when something that is not present 
to him is to be the subject of a painter's work, he may steady 
his task of rendition by employing a stand-in, mock-up, or 
substitute-things of this world that are materially to hand 
and can serve as guides during phases of the canvas 
processing. Thus, for an historical figure, he may use a living 
person there in the flesh; for a mythical beast with unnatural 
appendages, a real beast with natural ones. A material guide 
is often called a model, especially when a person or animal is 
involved, and will be called that here, although other (and 
confusingly relevant) meanings can also be given to that term 
(Goffman 1974, esp. 41 ). Note, incidentally, a parallel 
distinction in the theater, where it is fully understood that a 
character or protagonist belongs to a make-believe realm of 
being that is dramatized, and the actor who takes a part and 
stages its character belongs to another, namely, everyd·ay 
reality. Indeed, from the theater comes the term "prop" to 
remind us that some artifacts have, as it were, no life of their 
own, taking their identifying title from the fact that their 
crude similarity to certain objects in the real world (along 
with their cheapness and maneuverability) allows them to be 
used in plays as if they were these objects, this role in 
dramaturgy being their only one. 
If one allows that a painter may use a material object as a 
11 Matters can get a little complicated here. A movie actor may be 
given a stand-in so that in staging a character he himself will not have 
to engage in tedious or dangerous activity. Clearly (and simply): a 
model for a model. Novelists, with no intent to engage in covert 
biography, sometimes pattern a fictional character upon a real person 
in their social circle, subject and model here being quite distinct, there 
being an obligation to blur the copy and make a secret of the identity 
of the model. Biography, on the other hand, allows and requires that 
the subject and model be one. In biographical plays, then, the 
character onstage becomes a refraction both of the actor who is 
taking the part and of the person who was the inspiration for the part. 
It is a tart experience (or a sad experience), but not necessarily a 
confusing one, that is produced when the inspiration for a character 
serves also as the actor of the part, as when the famous gunfighters of 
the West ended their years by "going on the road" with enactments of 
themselves. The tricky case is the roman a clef, where a connection 
between subject and model is formally denied (as prefatory 
admonitions regarding the coincidence of resemblance attest) but 
guide (whether model, prop, or whatever) to help him in his 
rendering, and if this guiding function is taken as central to 
one's conception of such objects, then one might extend the 
category to include objects which the artist uses not only as a 
guide but also as a subject. After all, to sit for a portrait is to 
serve as a subject and as its model, and so one is forced to say 
that a stand-in can be the real thing. 11 
Unlike what is required in drawing, painting, or fiction, 
but like the theater, a photograph requires material 
guides-"models" in the cases that interest us. The play of 
light and shadow upon something out there in the real world 
is necessary, and furthermore, is necessary at the moment the 
picture is taken. 
Observe that just a·s a photograph can be said to be of its 
subject, this being our first sense of "of," so it can be said to 
be of its model, this being our second sense of "of." The 
convenience of using one word here instead of two, is, I 
believe, a disaster for analysis, for although biblical paintings 
and the theatrical stage provide no problem in the distinction 
between subject and model (or character and actor), photog-
raphy deeply confounds the matter in several ways-now 
merging subject and model, now concealing a difference, now 
taking a difference for granted, and in general causing us to 
think we are concerned with one problem when we really are 
concerned about another. 
IV (1) A "caught" or "candid" photograph may be defined as featuring models that have not been 
arrayed to serve as such, that is, to serve as something to 
photograph on this occasion. Such pictures show objects and 
events as they are in regard to some matters other than 
photography. For human models this means ordinarily that 
they are unaware that a camera is where it is, or that they are 
so deeply caught up in other vital matters that they either 
give no weight to the fact that they are being photographed 
or modify whatever they are doing only to the extent 
required for a disjunctive monitoring shift in response to the 
sudden appearance of a camera. 1 2 (All models can be angled, 
if not manipulated, for photographic effect; only human 
ones can do this on their own behalf.) Caught pictures can 
provide valid documents or records, allowing the viewer to 
make relatively reliable inferences as to what had led up to 
the activity represented and what was likely to have 
guessing at the identity of the model is encouraged (or at least 
thought to be), along with the belief that the copying is close. 
12 1n fact, matters are a little more complicated. Of the infinite 
number of scenes photographers might catch, they manage to (and 
bother to) catch only a small number, and these tend to be ones 
whose content make evident that the pictures could only have been 
caught. So a caught picture turns out to be a patently caught one. 
Also note that whereas the term "caught" seems to be preferentially 
applied to a scene upon which a camera would have been unlikely, the 
term "candid" seems to be preferentially used in reference to scenes 
wherein the participants would ordinarily have been unwilling to 
continue on with what they had been doing had they but known that 
a camera was in action. Understandably, some candid pictures present 
models breaking frame, not only turning precipitously to monitor the 
camera's intrusion, but also simultaneously attempting to obscure the 
appearance they had been giving. What is candid about such pictures 
turns out to be covering behavior, not what the behavior covers. 
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followed, in the same way, if to a lesser extent, as can an 
actual viewer of a live scene infer what is going on at the 
moment of viewing. It is in this way that caught pictures can 
be used as strong evidence concerning the existence of a state 
of affairs or of the occurrence of an event. Thus, a pictured 
individual who can be "personally identified," that is, a 
subject that provides us with effective evidence of the 
biographical identification of its model, can serve to demon-
strate that its model had been in a certain place doing a 
certain thing and in association with certain others, which 
demonstration courts of law may be induced to accept. For 
example, insurance claims for injuries have been defeated by 
photographs secretly taken of the claimant while he was 
engaged in demanding performances, such as bowling, 
climbing ladders, and the like. Denial of "knowing" someone 
has similarly been defeated by pictures of the claimant 
chatting with the person he claims not to know. Bank 
robbers have faced similar problems due to security photo-
graphy. In fact, on occasion in courts, claims as to what 
occurred may find better support through photographs than 
through direct testimony. Drawings, however real is tic, are 
not used in this particular way, although they can be 
employed in identificatory pol ice work. 1 3 
{2) Caught photographs are to be contrasted to another 
class, whose members share the property that inferences as to 
what was going on in the scene cannot be correctly made 
from what is pictured. 
First, there are photographs {often caught ones) which 
have been covertly "doctored" or "faked," as when a picture 
of someone's face is superimposed on a picture of someone 
else's body, and the whole passed off as evidence that the 
13
1n his Art and Illusion, E. H. Gombrich presents the interesting 
argument that a picture cannot be true or false in itself, these 
possibilities being reserved for the caption or label: 
Logicians tell us- and they are not people to be easily 
gainsaid - that the terms "true" and "false" can only be applied to 
statements, propositions. And whatever may be the usage of 
critical parlance, a picture is never a statement in that sense of the 
term. It can no more be true or false than a statement can be blue 
or green. Much confusion has been caused in aesthetics by 
disregarding this simple fact. It is an understandable confusion 
because in our culture pictures are usually labeled, and labels, or 
captions, can be understood as abbreviated statements. When it is 
said "the camera cannot lie," this confusion is apparent. 
Propaganda in wartime often made use of photographs falsely 
labeled to accuse or exculpate one of the warring parties. Even in 
scientific illustrations it is the caption which determines the truth 
of the picture. In a cause celebre of the last century, the embryo 
of a pig, labeled as a human embryo to prove a theory of 
evolution, brought about the downfall of a great reputation. 
Without much reflection, we can all expand into statements the 
laconic captions we find in museums and books. When we read the 
name "Ludwig Richter" under a landscape painting, we know we 
are thus informed that he painted it and can begin arguing whether 
this information is true or false. When we read "Tivoli," we infer 
the picture is to be taken as a view of that spot, and we can again 
agree or disagree with the label. How and when we agree, in such a 
case, will largely depend on what we want to know about the 
object represented. The Bayeux tapestry, for instance, tells us 
there was a battle of Hastings. It does not tell us what Hastings 
"looked like." [1961:67-68]. 
In sum, a caption frames a picture, telling us what aspect of it is to be 
attended a~d in what light this aspect of matters is to be seen - e.g., 
the way thmgs once were, the way they might be in the future, the 
owner of the face was present in the scene depicted. Or a 
seriously misleading caption is employed encouraging a false 
attribution of model to subject. 
Second are the kind of pictures that can be said to be 
arranged, rigged, or set up, implying that models and scenic 
materials, real enough in their own right, were brought 
together and choreographed to induce radically wrong 
inferences as to "who" had been present and/or what had 
been going on. The result is a picture of a covertly contrived 
scene; the picture is an actual one, but it is not actually of 
the scene it portrays. The classic case here is the collusively 
arranged infidelity picture, once so popular in British divorce 
proceedings, providing perfectly valid evidence that a 
particular man had been in a particular room with a 
particular woman not his wife, the misleading restricted to 
their doings and her professional identity. The wrong 
impression the court is induced to receive {or rather gives the 
appearance of receiving) is much like the one that the hotel 
clerk could have obtained of the actual doings, although he 
might get to see the picture taking as well as the scene the 
picture taker took. Observe that a doctored picture, whether 
intended to mislead or not, requires no cooperation from the 
models, the fabrication being done after, not before, picture 
taking; rigged pictures, on the other hand, ordinarily require 
collaborative posing before the picture is snapped, although 
admittedly if models are caught at the right moment from 
the right angle, they can find that they have unintentionally 
produced a picture that is rigged in effect/ 4 as they can if 
they know they are about to be photographed but the 
photographer does not know they know. Observe, too, that 
although eyes and cameras can be similarly fooled, it is 
dream of the artist, a tribute to the style of some period, and so forth. 
But, of course, this approach entirely begs the question. In a great 
number of contexts an uncaptioned photograph is understood to 
present a claim regarding the properties and character of the model, 
courts of law only being the most obvious. (The very fact that effort 
is made to doctor pictures presupposes that ordinarily pictures imply 
an avowal about reality and that this avowal is ordinarily validj the 
same assumption is not made of other modes of representation, and 
understandably so.) Any object, not merely a picture, is subject to 
covert simulation and various forms of overt reconstitutings. These 
transformations nonetheless remain just that, transformations of an 
original. But granted that the interpretation a picture is given, that is, 
the sense in which it is taken, derives from the context of use, one 
must see that the caption, when there is one, is but one part of this 
context. A caption, then, can be true or false only if its context 
carries another caption, albeit a tacit one: "The statements made here 
are meant to be taken as avowals of what is." And the reading a 
caption can cause us to make of a picture, other elements of context 
can cause us to make of the caption. (The caption "fantasy" can tell 
us how to read a picture in an art book, but what does it tell us about 
a picture in the National Lampoon?) A statement of fact, laconic or 
expanded , can be presented as a quotation, an example of literary 
style, a display of print format, etc., being no less vulnerable to 
special readings than are pictures. In any case, a photograph that is 
falsely captioned (whether to deceive or for openly playful purposes) 
can still present a perfectly valid representation of its model, the only 
problem being that the model can't be correctly identified from the 
caption. May I add that although obviously the angle, light, timing, 
camera distance, lens, film development, printing, and the photo-
grapher's intent can very significantly influence what a picture 
reproduces, in every case the model must introduce a pattern of 
constraints as well. 
14 
For this, and for other suggestions incorporated without 
acknowledgment, I am grateful to Richard Chalfen. 
82 STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
usually far easier to hoodwink the viewer of a picture than 
the viewer of a live scene, for reasons quite apart from, say, 
the consequence of insufficient depth cues. For the still 
photographer's practice of holding his camera to a small field 
and (necessarily) to a single angle can, in the shooting of a 
rigged scene, protect his illusion from anything disconfirming 
that might lie just beyond the posing; and what has been 
posed need only be held long enough to snap it. A live viewer 
could hardly be restricted this way, and unless he wore 
blinders and kept his head in a vice, would have to be faced 
with fakery that is considerably more extensive if it is to be 
effective- although admittedly he is not often in a position 
to pore over what he sees for flaws, whereas the viewer of a 
picture usually is. 
(3) Pictures that are covertly doctored or covertly rigged . 
display scenes that can't be read in the same way that 
uncontrived ones routinely can, as a swarm of warrants for 
drawing sound conclusions as to who had been present and 
what had been going on there. Such covertly faked pictures-
"fabrications"-are to be distinguished from ones that are 
also concocted, but this time admittedly, whether by 
arranging what is photographed or doctoring a photograph 
already taken. 1 5 Openly contrived scenes provide a "keying" 
of photographic evidence as to who was present and what 
had been going on. 16 The central example here is what might 
be called "commercial realism," the standard transformation 
employed Tr1 contemporary ads, in which the scene is 
conceivable in all detail as one that could in theory have 
occurred as pictured, providing us with a simulated slice of 
life; but although the advertiser does not seem intent on 
passing the picture off as a caught one, the understanding 
seems to be that we will not press him too far to account for 
just what sort of reality the scene has. (The term "realistic," 
like the term "sincerity" when applied to a stage actor, is 
self-contradictory, meaning something that is praiseworthy 
by virtue of being like something else, although not that 
something else.) Commercial realism is to be sharply distin-
guished from scenes posed with unlikely professionals and 
apparently intended to be wrongly seen as caught, and from 
scenes that are caught ones but now embedded in an 
advertisement. 1 7 Observe that commercial realism provides 
15 Currently newspapers and magazines exercise very wide liberty 
in presenting openly doctored pictures featuring bits of anatomy of ce-
lebrities, especially political ones, the portraits completed by line draw-
ings, cartoons, other photographs, and the like. Precisely in what frame 
readers interpret such pictures is not clear, since what can be legally de-
fended as an evident fantasy may not be so treated by some viewers. 
16 
A fuller treatment of "keying" and "fabrication" is presented in 
Goffman (1974, esp. ch. 3, 4). 
17
There are deviations from commercial realism that are more 
subtle. Thus, one finds that a picture in an annual company report 
displaying the company's restaurant equipment with the aid of two 
secretaries posing as persons dining out and another as a waitress can 
convey not so much that there is a difference between subject and 
model, but that these particular models are not making every effort to 
conceal that they are unprofessional ones, thereby posing as models 
posing as participants in a restaurant scene. A comparable frame 
complexity is found in the use of simulated home movies as part of 
the scenario of a commercial one, or the use in radio commercials of 
"interviews" with carefully selected ordinary consumers, "citizens," 
who have been rehearsed into displaying the restarts, filled pauses, 
and little floodings that presumably distinguish the efforts of real 
interviewees from the responses performed by studio actors. 
especially nice examples of the subject-model issue. Asked 
what is in a particular ad, we might say, "A family fishing." 
What makes us think the four subjects in the picture are in a 
family relationship to one another is exactly what might 
make us infer such a relationship with respect to strangers in 
real life. So, too, on seeing images of fishing lines in the 
water. Asked whether we think the four persons who 
modeled for the picture are really a family or if there are 
hooks on the lines, the answer could well be, "Probably not, 
but what does it matter?" The point about an ad is what its 
composer meant us to infer as to what is going on in the 
make-believe pictured scene, not what had actually been 
going on in the real doings that were pictured. The issue is 
subject, not model. 
It is thus that the constraints on picture scene production 
can be properly sorted. An ad featuring a nude woman 
subject raises questions about the modesty of the model, 
especially if she is a well-known one; an ad featuring nuns 
clustered in front of a station wagon in honor of GM 's 
tilt-wheel steering can (and did) raise questions about the 
desecration of subjects-the models in this case being well 
covered by unaccustomed habit (see Livingston 1976). 
Advertisements that employ commercial realism or some 
other variety of overtly concocted scene can be aptly 
compared to what the stage presents. In both cases the 
viewer is to engage knowingly in a kind of make-believe, 
treating the depicted world as if it were real-like but of 
course not actually real. The differences are interesting. One 
is that although we undoubtedly can involve ourselves more 
deeply in staged make-believe than in advertisements, it is 
probably the case that viewers more frequently reify, that is, 
"downkey," ads than plays; for we can always fall into 
thinking that an ad is like a news shot or a private portrait, 
its model rightly to be identified with its subject. (In any 
case, the imputation of realness to what a picture is of is 
unlikely to require our immediate intercession, the presented 
events having already transpired; on the other hand, when 
Othello attacks Desdemona, something will have to be done 
immediately by the audience if they have misframed him as 
endangering a real life.) Another difference: It is routine in 
play production that we know the personal identity of the 
models, at least the lead ones, and that our pleasure in the 
show derives in part from watching favorite actors at work, 
whatever the part they are currently at work in. In the case 
of ads, with very rare exception, the personal identity of the 
models is unknown to us, and we do not seek out this 
knowledge. Product testimony by celebrities, or by specially 
selected citizens whose actual names and addresses are 
provided, is quite another matter and is by way of being a 
fraud - a fabrication, not a keying. An interesting marginal 
case is the photoroman, popular on the continent, in which 
personally identified models- indeed "stars" of the cinematic 
world-perform for a series of stills in the manner of a comic 
book, projecting themselves in fictional parts much as they 
might on the screen, and as on the screen relying on their 
''own" identities as a source of drawing power (see Van 
Dormael 1974). 
V Starting with caught scenes, the description has been complicated by adding ones that were fabricated and 
keyed. Now it is essential to go on to see that all these 
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pictures share one important feature, namely, they are all 
scenes, that is, representations, whether candid, faked, or 
frankly simulated, of "events" happening. Narrative-like 
action is to be read from what is seen, a before and after are 
to be inferred, and this location in the ongoing stream of 
activity provides the context as much as do the models and 
props per se. All such pictures are to be distinguished from 
another class, namely, portaits, these being pictures-
fabricated, keyed, or actually of-where action is absent or 
incidental, and it cannot quite be said that a scene is in 
progress. A subject is featured more than a stream of events. 
(1) Consider first the matter of the personal portrait 
format itself. This format was there before the camera came 
in, has dominated private pictures, and is only now giving 
way: the model sits or stands in his finery, holds an absent, 
half-smiling expression on his face in the direction he is 
instructed to-a constraint only familiar from the military 
parade ground-and renders himself up to the judgment of 
eternity, the assumption rightly being that in many ways the 
model and the subject are one, a case of posing as oneself. No 
doubt this postural formula reflected the exposure needs of 
early film and the style (and requirements) established in 
painted portraiture- providing us a central case of pictures 
representing other pictures; in any case, no prototype is to be 
found in the responses individuals, at least sighted ones, have 
to any other circumstance in the workaday world. 1 8 
(Certainly responses of every kind can be affected and held 
by brute force for lengthy periods, but these responses are 
presented as though in reaction to something other than 
picture taking.) When this portrait format is extended to 
commercial shots featuring a subject and a product, the 
unseeing expression often gives way to one that is not alien 
to natural life, merely crudely simulated: a frozen, sum-
moning look, as though the subject were making eye contact, 
sometimes collusively, with someone · there in the flesh 
behind the shutter, or with a wider group out there in camera 
land. Also found is an expression of defense against 
intrusion, a subtle means of encouraging the viewer to feel he 
is an actual participant in the depicted scene. So, too, 
subjects, especially female ones, may be shown returning our 
apparently intrusive look with one that passively submits to 
our gaze. More subtle still, the subject can give the 
appearance of turning away from a second figure in the 
picture sometimes to steal a look at a third figure, in any case 
allowing us to catch the maneuver from a disclosive angle so 
that we find ourselves more privy to this disloyalty of 
attention than is the subject who has lost it. The simulation 
18
1n recent years stylish portrait photographers have broken with 
the traditional format. Instead of inducing frozen facial dignity in a 
model, they track down expressions of warmth, charm, liveliness, and 
so forth, producing a sense that the individual has been unself-
consciously caught in action. To obtain these expressions, a 
considerable warm-up period may be employed and a second camera, 
so that the model will not quite know when and from what precise 
angle his image will be taken. In this way, every customer can be 
transformed into a fitting object for sympathetic, candid photography 
and high symbolism, becoming someone who expresses his character, 
as well as his status, allowing photographers to make a statement 
every time their camera speaks. It is through such practices that those 
who make a living reproducing appearances of life can continue 
further to stamp the real thin~ out. 
of viewer-responsive facial expression by subjects somewhat 
changes a portrait into a scene and is, of course, a standard 
feature of Western painting. 1 9 And note the parallel to a 
phenomenon peculiar to the legitimate stage called "direct 
address." 
(2) Early private photographic portraits employed canvas 
backdrops featuring sylvan or hellenic scenes (deemed proper 
in their three dimensional form to the gentry), thus taking 
open advantage of the principle that the camera, somewhat 
like the theatrical stage, drops from the world everything 
between the figures or objects in central focus and what lies 
in front, and at the same time tends to reduce what remains 
of the embedding context to a background, a depthless 
plane. A recent commercial version is the high fashion 
frieze-again something that does not mimic nature-which 
splays pristinely costumed female figures flush against exotic 
slabs of nature where perhaps only goats and mendicants are 
actually to be found, nature here serving as a substitute for 
canvas. 
(3) In portraiture, this transformation of contextual 
space into a point of focus and a flat background is matched 
by the transformation of microecological space. Self-
commemoration by a kin group, team, school, or association 
packs familiars into compact rank-and-file clusters, graded 
for height; decorative kneeling and pyramiding can also be 
employed. This assures that a likeness of all the faces wnl 
show in the picture, along with at least an inferential view of 
the corresponding bodies, and all this as large as the camera 
can manage. In this bunching-up of models in order to take a 
picture, microecology and body contact are given a sys-
tematically different reading than obtains in any other frame, 
although the staging of choral singers comes close. Observe, I 
have been talking about real space between real people-
models, not subjects. The current commercial version of 
group pictures presents an even more striking reconstitution 
of space, for it brings into jolly togetherness a deep-sea diver, 
a Chinese cook, a ballet dancer, a black nurse, a middle-age 
housewife, and a grey-haired banker, causing subjects whom 
all of social life conspires to keep separate to be arm in arm, 
nullifying the basic metaphor indexing social distance 
through interpersonal physical space. But, of course, there is 
a profound difference between commemoratives and com-
mercials. Teammates who entwine themselves for a portrait 
produce a picture of themselves displaying this territorial 
promiscuity; professional models who similarly pose them-
selves do not produce a picture of themselves but of 
subjects chosen by advertiser, and it is the intermingling 
of subjects in the pictured space, not models in the studio's, 
that is striking. After all, professional models, like pro-
fessional actors, have given up almost all natural claims and 
can be caused to appear in almost any guise and almost any 
posture. 
(4) An individual who serves as a model for a personal 
portrait-or does anything else-is someone with a unique 
biographical individuality, allowing for a matching between 
19 See, for example, Rubens' Helene Fourment in a Fur Coat, and 
the discussion in Berger (1975:60-61 ). I might add that a whole art 
has developed in radio and TV to induce performers to project their 
talk as if to actual audiences located at some prescribed distance, and 
as if part of a current interaction. On the contingencies of training 
political candidates in these techniques, see Carey (1976). 
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subject and personal identity of the model, providing only 
that the model is known personally, or at least known of, by 
the viewer. (Thus the photographic game of identifying baby 
pictures or high school photos or of matching early pictures 
of celebrities against their current image.) For viewers of a 
portrait, this matching possibility is crucial; ritual use cannot 
be made of pictures of just anyone, only pictures of the 
famed or of those within one's own circle. In the case of 
commercial pictures, this linkage is unnecessary-except in 
regard to celebrity or "citizen" testimonials. 
Observe that in photographic portraits, the model is 
fran kly " posed." His having taken up a position before the 
camera simply in order to be photographed in no way 
detracts from the picture being thought an authentic, "real" 
one. Moreover, what is pictured is what is really going on, 
namely, portraiture, the giving of the model over to the 
process of being rendered . We would not say, then, that such 
a picture was "merely posed," as though to correct anyone's 
belief that it was something else. That the background may 
be a mere picture of scenery does not discredit the portrait 
either, for here there is no pretense that anything but a prop 
is involved. 
One is reminded here of the frame complexity of 
apparently naive photographs and the diverse realms of being 
we seem able to easily amalgamate. For example, a photo-
graph may involve not only a model who is a real person and 
a backdrop which is a painting of trees, but also a framed 
photograph or oil portrait, real in its own sense, used as a 
scenic resource, introducing still another plane of events. 
Indeed, at the turn of the century mortuary pictures were to 
be found in which a framed photographic portrait of the 
deceased was set amidst wreaths and real flowers, all placed 
in front of a cloudy canvas sky and photographed. 
(Incidentally, what resulted was a photograph of a photo-
graph, something that is frame-distinct from a print off the 
same negative, the rephotograph of a photograph, and, of 
course, a letterpress reproduction of a photograph.) In all of 
these ways photographic portraiture has from the beginning 
involved embeddings of material from one frame into 
materials in another, 2 0 a practice, incidentally, long 
employed in painting. 
A "real" photographic portrait may be one that strikes 
the viewer as bad in various ways: it may be unflattering or 
fail to capture the personality the model is "known" to have 
or be badly composed, lighted, printed, and so forth. But 
these deficiencies do not reflect on the genuineness or 
authenticity of the portrait. A question of fabrication and 
keying, a question of reality, would enter when we dis-
covered that the portrait was "really" of someone else, 
merely someone who looked like the model we thought was 
involved or that the picture contained the mere posing of a 
posing, as when a commercial advertisement presents some-
20
Examples may be found in Lesy (1973). Postcards early in this 
century also employed embeddings, the beautiful beloved of the 
lonely lover appearing in a balloon above his head, ofttimes 
competing for free space with her photograph or portrait, this being a 
third realm employed, I suppose, in case the point was missed. Note, 
the equivalent of a thought balloon's access to the heated brain of a 
figure was a privilege of novelists before the camera was invented. 
thing meant to be seen as though a private photographic 
portrait when in fact a professional model did the work, 
posing in a way he would not were he posing for a 
photograph of himself for his own private use. To which 
must be added the fact that almost from the beginning of 
private personal photographic portraiture, models guyed the 
process, taking an avowedly "funny" picture, for example, 
one which extended the represented scenery into everything 
but a hole for the model's real head to be popped through, or 
one in which the model assumed a purposely comic pose. 
Commercial pictures then added a lamination, presenting 
pictures of professional models posed as private persons 
guying a portrait pose. I might add that when a genuine 
private photographic portrait is borrowed by a student, 
transformed into a slide, and presented to an audience as an 
instance of photographic portraiture, then one might have to 
say that although a real portrait is being used, it is not being 
used in the way intended, and no ritual attaches to its 
perception. Form remains; function changes. 
Finally, look again at the notion of "posing." A com-
mercial model staging an ad in which he is to appear as a 
doctor is "posing," an activity clearly different from 
"imposturing" as a doctor (as when someone attempts to 
practice medicine without training or a license), and akin to 
"acting" a medical role in a movie. But even more clearly, 
someone "posing" for his portrait is not doing so in the 
commercial model's sense. For, as suggested, in private 
portraits there is ordinarily no effort to use scenic cues to 
provide the viewer of the picture with an understanding that 
a make-believe world is pictured whose subjects have a social 
and personal identity little matching that of the models. 
Commercial posing avowedly transforms a model into almost 
anyone the advertiser wants to construct an imaginary scene 
around; private portraiture transforms a model into a 
decorative representation of himself, the two "ofs" of 
photography here nicely blended. Observe that the question 
of primping or posturing for the camera is not here at issue. 
Private portraiture, public portraiture for purposes of 
publicity, caught news shots of national leaders, and even art 
photography of "interesting looking" faces, all reflect the 
fundamental fact that their models are not presenting 
themselves in a personal or social identity not their "own"; 
that is what underlies our commonsense designation of these 
pictures as "actually of" their subjects. All are to be 
contrasted to commercial make-believe, whether fanciful or 
fully realistic, for whether a model poses as a doctor or 
Napoleon or the devil does not signify here; in all cases 
subject and model would not be the same, leading us to say 
that we do not have an actual picture of a doctor, Napoleon, 
or the devil. (Which is not to say that a model who poses as a 
doctor will not provide us with an actual photograph, nor an 
actual photograph of an adult, a male, a white person, a 
good-looker, a professional model, and so forth. Nor to deny 
that an actual photograph of a doctor is a possibility, 
whereas an actual photograph of Napoleon or the devil is 
not, although an actual photograph of an actual portrait of 
Napoleon is, whereas of the devil, not.) 
VI It is apparent that the standards we bring to judging pictured scenes are not quite those we bring to 
judging picture portraits: of the first, is it doctored or 
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contrived, and in either case, covertly or overtly; of the 
second, is it "touched up," faithful, flattering, and the like. 
(Ordinary concerns usually neglect the possibility that what 
might seem to be a private portrait might really be the 
fabrication or keying of one, this neglect due, perhaps, to the 
fact that a portrait is already a keying, already a ritualization 
of the human form, already a departure from the simple 
rendering of an aspect of the world the way it is for us.) In 
any case, the question can be raised as to how, apart from 
portraiture, photographs can feature subjects in a way that is 
systematically different from the way their models might 
deploy themselves when not before a camera. Here, then, is a 
concern that does not bear on issues associated with the 
physiology and psychology of perception. In brief, what are 
the systematic differences between scenes openly contrived 
for picturing and live scenes whose participants are un-
concerned about being photographed; or, put the other way, 
what are the systematic differences between pictures of 
openly contrived scenes and pictures of uncontrived ones? 
(1) Perhaps the most obvious departure from reality that 
photography provides is commercial syncretism. The 
capacity to put together a realistic looking scen.e to 
photograph is not far away from the capacity to put together 
a scene whose individual elements are imaginable as real but 
whose combination of elements the world itself could not 
produce or allow. Thus fantastical pictures in which a subject 
speaks to us from within a block of ice or while soaring 
through the air, or mingles socially with figures from myth or 
with notables long since dead but now returned in their 
prime, or seriously displays ineptness, braggadocio, fear-
fulness, and hauteur we would only expect to find in 
conscious buffoonery, or is subjected to our reading his 
thoughts in a balloon that the other figures in the picture 
can't see. A more subtle complexity is found in those ads 
which intendedly satirize other ads, thus elevating the 
make-believe world portrayed in one picture into real 
materials to copy in the make-believe world of another, 
providing thus a keying of a keying. 
(2) Consider now involvement structure. A feature of 
social situations is that participants are obliged to sustain 
appearances of spontaneous involvement in appropriate 
matters at hand. Evidence of an individual's involvement will 
come from the direction and mobility of his gaze, as well as 
the alignment of his eyes, head, and trunk, these ordinarily 
oriented in the same direction. Now it seems that of all 
obligatory appearances, that of correct involvement is the 
hardest to simulate, and this as if by design. Any attempt to 
produce an appropriate show of involvement in something 
tends to produce instead an appearance of involvement in the 
task of affecting such involvement. 2 1 Although most 
individuals acquire the capacity to convincingly contrive a 
show of interest in what another is saying or doing, ability 
falters when they are required to simulate "natural" 
involvement within more complex social arrangements, as 
when listening to talk that the talker is himself simulating, or 
expressing to one participant a shared reaction regarding 
another, or maintaining one conversation in very close 
proximity to another. At such moments the individual is 
21
See Goffman, "Alienation from Interaction" (1967:113-136). 
likely to induce a sense of uneasiness in viewers, due to the 
perceived overfixedness of his gaze and his failure to align 
trunk, head, and eyes in the manner we have come to expect. 
Perhaps the most obtrusive example is to be seen when an 
individual glances at a camera or persons monitoring him but 
tries to prevent his trunk and his head from following his 
eyes. May I add that our capacity to discern microscopic 
discrepancies in anticipated alignments of eyes, head, and 
trunk is simply enormous. 
(3) Another sort of photographic departure from reality 
can be seen by contrasting portraits and scenes. It is clear 
that although an image of a person or even of a group of 
persons (if in staggered array) can be rather fully caught from 
the front by the camera's straight-on eye, the activity in 
natural social situations can rarely be well pictured from such 
an angle. Best vantage point must be chosen afresh for each 
configuration, and this can involve a positioning of the 
camera that an eye and its person could hardly manage in 
natural social life. More important,_ activity may have to be 
broken up and spread open, for a camera cannot peer inside 
the inward-facing encirclements often found. (After all, 
portrait posing is not a posture dictated by what can go on in 
social situations; it is through and through an answer to the 
special needs of the camera and to the character. of 
portraiture.) And such a spread-out array can be staged to 
incorporate devices for directing the attention of the viewer 
to a central person, which devices do not otherwise appear in 
nature. Thus in political publicity shots, one practice is to 
have the leader's advisors and children turn their faces from 
the camera and self-effacingly look at the main figure, 
deictically pointing with their faces and sometimes their 
hands in the direction that attention is to follow, even while 
the central person waves directly to the camera and the crowd. 
All of this is found only where there is a front-on audience or a 
camera, and is radically different from the inward turning ex-
hibited in ordinary face-to-face interaction.22 
There are other instructive differences between portraits 
and pictured scenes. In both cases, the persons who model 
for the pictures have unique biographical (personal) 
identities. As suggested, for the owner of a photographic 
portrait, the possibility of making this identification is 
central to the ritual function the portrait will have. But not 
so in the case of commercial pictures, except perhaps when 
the picture features a personal testimonia1.2 3 Presumably 
22 0ther unnatural devices for exhibiting dominance are available 
to photographers. For example, a cliche of advertisements is to 
picture one individual who is in the close company of another looking 
at that other adoringly and self-effacingly, as if the other's use of the 
advertised product had rendered him worthy of such attention. Al-
though openly loving looks at close quarters are sometimes addressed 
to the very young as part of their easy transformation into nonper-
sons, these expressions between adults are not common, being incom-
patible with other interaction obligations of the adorer to the adored. 
2 3 
Portraits taken of anonymous models by renowned photo-
graphers can become prized by the collectors, and in this sense have 
ritual value, but here because the picture provides a contact with the 
taker, not the taken. There are, of course, various efforts to constitute 
photographs into objects of scarcity-into relics-and thereby into items 
of monetary value. Prints from the original negative are apparently dis-
tinguishable from re-photographs of the text. The skill involved in 
developing and enlarging can itself be claimed as identifiable and 
therefore a means of distinguishing products. Etc. (For all of which, 
and for much other help, I am grateful to Lee Ann Draud.} 
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what the advertisement is concerned to depict is not 
particular individuals already known, but rather activity 
which would be recognizable were we to see it performed in 
real life by persons not known to us personally. (Which is not 
to say that the subjects may not be depicted in a manner to 
imply that they would naturally know each other very well.) 
In effect, pictured scenes show examples of categories of 
persons, not particular persons. Now observe that although in 
real life we obtain lots of views of persons whom we can 
merely place in social categories, unless we also know them 
personally or have good business reasons to be dealing with 
them, we are not in a position to witness what we witness 
about them in commercial scenes. Indeed, there are many 
pictured scenes, such as that of husband and wife in their 
bedroom, that no business or acquaintanceship could warrant 
our seeing. Only a peeping tom of unprecedented capabilities 
could manage the view. Like readers of what a novelist 
supplies of his characters, the viewer becomes god-like, 
unconstrained by any need of legitimate social grounds for 
being privy to what is depicted in the scene. 2 4 In short, the 
possibility of arranging a scene from the visual pinpoint of 
view of a single camera's eye-into which angle and distance 
of vision vast hordes of viewers can be thrust-is a social 
license as well as an optical one. 
(4) A feature of the photographic frame is the possibility of 
eschewing the depiction of ordinary life for high symbolism. 
Thus, an image of part of a model's body can be made to fill 
the whole picture, articulated to be read as a deep comment 
on the entire human condition, not merely an example 
drawn from it, and providing us with a picture whose subject 
is not a person but a small part of the anatomy, such as a 
fingertip. A lesser version of this expressionism must be 
considered, being more common and probably more signifi-
cant. 
In real situations, we externalize our circumstances and 
intent, in effect facilitating the adaptation of others in our 
surround to us. But in a manner of speaking, this display 
tends to occur as part of a stream of acts in the same order of 
being, some of which acts have just occurred and others of 
which are likely to start occurring. In private and publicity 
portraiture, individuals can be given a quite different relation 
to what they display. Two boxers taking weighing-in 
pub I icity shots will assume a fighting pose, choreographing 
an illustration of the actions they will engage in. But these 
actions are "mere" representations, totally cut off from any 
actual sequence in which the orginals might occur. And 
indeed, little competence in fistic arts is required- to evince 
the pose. What we obtain are photographic recordings of 
emblems, not actions. Similarly, when a renowned scientist 
graciously submits to a magazine interview (in the interests 
of disseminating knowledge), he is likely to be posed 
fingering his equipment as though a slice of his occupational 
life had been caught: he is shown peering into a microscope, 
writing a formula on the board, holding a test tube up to the 
24
Cartoon strips provide other transformations of the everyday. 
For example, the protagonists can be at a distance or even hidden yet 
their words can be ballooned into the foreground, in effect allowing 
the viewer to bug distal voices. Here, and in regard to other aspects of 
the transformation rules of the cartoon frame, see Fresnault-Deruelle 
(1975a, 1975b, 1976). 
light, or arranging a fossil. Thereby he crudely mimes a 
posture plucked from his own role, momentarily trans-
forming the living tools of his trade into dramaturgic 
equipment and himself into a pantomimist of fixed 
expressions. And what we see is not a photographic record of 
an actual scene from the scientist's life, as would be available 
were a secret camera trained on his laboratory, nor a clever 
contrivance of such a photographic record (this presented 
either as a real one or as an admitted simulation), but 
something that is only to be found as a posing for a picture, 
having been staged in response to a conception of what 
would make a colorful, telling photograph, and, behind this, 
a conception of what constitutes the appropriate convention 
for "representing" the particular calling. 2 5 Obviously in all 
these cases what one has is not intention display in the 
ethological sense, since emblems of the model's calling do 
not tell us what is to happen (or what is threatened or 
promised), but rather the sort of activity the model chooses 
to be identified with, this activity being symbolized, as it 
were, by a quotation of one of its dramatically telling 
phases. 2 6 What in fact probably has happened is that the 
staff photographer has okayed the pose, and what probably 
will happen is that the scientist will soon exchange 
pleasantries with his departing guests-these events belonging 
to an order of activity radically different from the one 
intendedly portrayed in the picture. 
VII It is plain, then, that except in the case of caught scenes, the arrangements of models and scenic 
resources that the camera photographs will differ sys-
tematically from the way the unposing world is. Now one 
should consider the contrary issue: the carryover of the way 
the world is to any photograph. For the transformational 
code for representing reality in pictures-the photographic 
frame-would hardly be a code were not some sort of 
relationship systematically preserved between what is trans-
formed and the transformation. But in the question of 
carryover, some preliminary discussion is required. 
Photographs (like pencil sketches) can be used to illustrate 
25 For this latter point, and for other suggestions incorporated 
without further acknowledgment, I am very grateful to john Carey. 
26 Scientists are here used as an example because one might think 
they would balk at such nonsense. Examples are even easier to find 
among business leaders who appear in news magazines and annual 
company reports busy with an executive-like action whose posing 
could only have taken them away from such duties. In truth it seems 
that nigh everyone can be persuaded by publicists to appear to the 
public at large in a mock-up of themselves and their occupations, an 
amateur theatrics to which politicians are also willing to subject their 
greetings, farewells, commiserations, and other intimacy rituals. Nor is 
this readiness to reframe one's own doings so that the public will get a 
synoptic view of one's role a particularly contemporary phenomenon. 
Bourgeois society has never wanted for persons ready to see the need 
for a permanent display of themselves in somber portrait oils, 
clutching a book, a ledger, a riding crop, or a rose, framing themselves 
thus in some sort of mystical relation to the equipment of their 
vocation, a touching encouragement to the worship that others might 
be willing to offer to exemplifications of what is best in humanity. 
Perhaps one should see the readiness for this sort of personal publicity 
as entirely natural to the self, and a modest life a perversion forced 
upon the masses for want of anything like an adequate supply of 
board rooms and marble fireplaces. 
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behavioral practices and arrangements, typically by virtue of 
models having been posed accordingly. The kind of practices 
photographs can best illustrate are those that are firmly 
codified as to form and can be represented from beginning to 
end, in toto, within the visual field that can be nicely 
encompassed 'by short-range camera focus. 2 7 Of course, one 
is likely to be interested in photographable behavioral 
practices because they are routinely associated with particu-
lar social meanings, and it is admittedly the sign vehicle, not 
the signification, that is precisely illustratable. 
As I use the term "illustration," no implication is 
intended about existence; an illustrated practice may have 
occurred, but illustration itself does not attest to such 
occurrence, belonging to subjects, not models. It is, then, 
perfectly reasonable to expect that illustrations may be 
found across several modes of representation, some clearly 
involving make-believe. For example, the "arm-lock," the 
standard adult cross-sex tie-sign in our society, can be 
illustrated by means of what can be found in comics, 
cartoons, realistic ads, news shots of celebrities who are 
"on," two actors taking the part of a couple on the theatrical 
stage, caught pictures from ordinary life scenes, and, of 
course, live scenes. More to the point, across these quite 
different realms of being, no systematic relevant difference 
seems detectable in the armlocks depicted; the form of this 
display can be, and very often is, perfectly represented in 
toto in any of these frames. 
Photographs can also be used to provide documentation or 
an instance-record of the sort of behavorial practice which 
can be illustrated pictorially. An instance-record is evidence 
(which a mere illustration is not) that an instance of the 
practice did occur as pictured on the occasion of the picture 
taking. Call such a picture an instantiation. Note that a 
picture which records an instance of a practice, that is, 
instantiates it, is necessarily a good illustration of it, 
something that can't be said of many other kinds of records. 
And observe that pictures can be used not merely to provide 
instance-records of practices already known, but also to help 
us become aware of practices theretofore unidentified. 
Now note that if one's interest is in the picturing of scenes 
as well as in the scenes that are pictured, then the difference 
between illustration and instantiation can become com-
plicated. For any photograph which merely illustrates a 
behavioral practice must also provide not merely an 
instance-record of the illustrative practice, but an instance 
itself. And the same can be said when one passes beyond 
illustration itself to symbolization, namely, a referencing 
based on what may be a loose, uncodified connection 
between sign and meaning {or a fixed but thoroughly 
conventional one), and upon an evoked significance which 
may bear little relation to the facts. A creditably candid 
wedding picture of the groom placing a ring on the finger of 
the bride not only attests reliably to a wedding having taken 
place, but also supplies us with a special segment of the 
ceremony, one that has come to serve as a symbol of the 
whole, and behind this, as a symbol of the presumably loving 
relationship that was solemnized on the occasion. In fact, 
2 7 
For example, tongue showing: Smith, Chase, and Lieblich 
(1974). 
however, the pictured event itself does not provide us with 
evidence of the sequence of specific ritual details out of 
which the wedding in question was formulated, or evidence 
of the quality of the relationship thereby ratified. What can 
be instantiated in completed form {and what is therefore 
most suitable to pictorial research) involves lesser matters, 
such as the asymmetry of the traditional ring ritual, the 
general styling of wedding rings, and the choice of fingers 
thought proper for the placement of this piece of ceremonial 
jewelry. On the other hand, an "expressive" picture does 
provide an actual instance of the use in pictures of 
stereotyped symbolizations of wider social events and 
relationships. 
The differences among illustrations, instance records, and 
symbolizations as here defined, complicate the analysis of 
pictures. A further bedevilment is the "photographic 
fallacy," namely, the very general tendency to confuse 
realness with represen tativeness and ideographic with 
nomothetic validity. A caught photograph of persons in 
action can provide all the evidence that one needs that a 
particular event- such as a wedding- very likely did occur. 
But that sufficiency is for those interested in the particulars 
of the past, in a word, biography. If instead one is interested 
in social routines, in customary behavioral patterns, then a 
wedding picture must differently figure; it can provide an 
instance record of, say, placement pattern with respect to the 
ring, but very little evidence concerning the social character-
istics of the populations across which the practice is found . 
and the\ range of contexts in which it occurs among these 
people- in fact, little evidence that one is dealing with a 
pattern at all. Yet when one establishes that a picture of 
something really is of the subject it portrays, it is very hard 
to avoid thinking that one has established something beyond 
this, namely, something about the event's currency, 
typicality, commonness, distribution, and so forth. The 
paradox is that "small behaviors" are what can be very fully 
instantiated by a single photograph, but one such picture can 
only establish the feasibility of actual occurrence. {The 
picture of Lee Harvey Oswald being shot provides excellent 
evidence of how a revolver was held on one occasion and, 
more important, Jack Ruby's guilt in this connection; but 
the picture provides little evidence of how hand guns are 
generally held for close range firing.) To which one must add 
that very often the sort of event whose mere occurrence-not 
typicality of occurrence- is of biographical or historic 
interest is one that cannot be photographed in the round 
throughout its course, but only in cross-section, as it were, 
this moment often providing very inadequate evidence of the 
occurrence and character of the event as a whole. 
VIII Turn now to the question of carryover. Whether a pictured scene is caught, faked, or, in varying 
degrees realistically mocked-up, the model will bring ele-
ments of himself to it, affording to the viewers something of 
what he affords the eyes of actual participants· in his real 
scenes. Just as a stage actor {but not an opera singer) can 
hardly perform a part in a language other than one in which 
he has a real competence, so models, professional or amateur, 
cannot transform themselves completely for a photographic 
appearance, at least if they are not to be encumbered with a 
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massive disguise. In theory at least, personal identity will be 
recoverable, ofttimes also the unique setting in which the 
photograph occurred (if not by us, then by modeling 
agencies, the police, kinsmen of the models, or whoever). 
However, if our interests are not ritualistic, as when we 
cherish a picture of Aunt Mabel because she herself can be 
identified in it, or legalistic, as when we establish that the 
person a certificate authorizes is the person who is presenting 
the authorization, or playful, as when we match early 
portraits against later ones, but rather academic, namely, to 
inquire into the way the world is, then identifiability as such 
ceases to be central. 
Other matters will be more important. We are all in our 
society trained to employ a somewhat common idiom of 
posture, position, and glances, wordlessly choreographing 
ourselves relative to others in social situations with the effect 
that interpretability of scenes is possible. Some of this idiom 
we automatically continue to employ in composing and 
posing for scenes that are to be photographed- jumbled up, 
of course, with crude patches of gross symbolization for the 
camera. 
But that is only the beginning, for however posed and 
"artificial" a picture is, it is likely to contain elements that 
record instances of real things. The scene pictured on the 
backdrop of a photographic portrait might be a painted 
fantasy, but the chair the subject sits on is real enough and 
speaks to a real genre of chairs, not pictures. (Students 
question the sense in which a chair can be said to be real, but 
that sort of doubt is not here at issue, for however that 
question is answered, the fact still remains that a picture of a 
chair is a radically different thing from a chair itself.) The 
clothes worn on the occasion are often Sunday best, 
sometimes causing the wearer to feel "unnatural," but, of 
course, in all likelihood there will be real ceremonial 
occasions when the same garb will have been worn, the 
limiting case here being the wedding gown, since it may be 
worn and pictured on the same and (often) only occasion. 
The way a female model for a seated private portrait manages 
her legs can be a very studied effect helped along sometimes 
by the photographer, but what the two here strive for in this 
apparently artificial way can be exactly what she strives for 
when seated at a party facing viewers from the front; what 
one is learning about, then, is how she might choreograph 
herself for front views in general, not for camera views in 
particular. The same can be said for the Western male 
practice of covering the crotch when in a sitting position. 
The fact that male subjects from non-Western cultures tend 
not to exhibit this protectiveness in portraits is not a specific 
difference between their pictures and ours, merely an 
incidental one, being specific to the more general issue of 
behavior when exposed to direct view, and pertains to 
models, not merely subjects. When a movie starlet couple at a 
nightclub back bench suddenly adjust their faces into the 
stylized teeth grimace found mainly in photographs, doing 
this because a cameraman has come into sight, the free 
distance between their rumps can still reflect spacing 
practices in uncontrived scenes, not merely contrived 
ones-although admittedly in photographs indexed distances 
and especially depths are hard to measure. And by examining 
the spacing and body orientation of the two in regard to 
other ~ubjects in the picture, we come to take it for granted, 
probably quite correctly, that the two constitute a "with," 
drawing here on precisely the same cues we would 
automatically employ when functioning as actual 
participants of live scenes. 
I X Given that pictures may be organized as portraits or as scenes (and if the latter, caught, faked, or realistic to a 
degree), and given the distinction between illustration and 
instantiation, and the contrast of both of these to evocative 
symbolizations providing at best a purely conventional 
relation between vehicle and sign, and given further that one 
can be concerned about the nature of pictures as well as the 
nature of the world, it is possible to begin to see how 
heterogeneous a photograph may be as an object of academic 
interest. 
One finds in pictures not only rules of scene production 
that are exclusive to pictures, but also photographic conven-
tions peculiar to particular subject matters. For example, 
portrait photographers routinely touch up negatives or prints 
to improve the complexion of the subjects appearing in 
them, creating a people that has smoother skin than that 
found among mortals. In ads brunette women tend to be 
styled somewhat differently from blond women; this 
presumably a characteristic of pictures, not I ife. 28 
The settings in which members of a family snap one 
another are not fabricated for the purpose, are not merely 
props, but, as with the real settings used in home movies, 29 
are hardly a haphazard selection from all the ones the family 
employs, and can only have the effect of producing a false 
general impression of its habitat. The expensive backdrops 
found in most commercial scenes can be found in the real 
world but only in very narrow circles. (Once rented or 
donated as background for a film or an advertisement, these 
environments can become merely another element of the 
world to which the viewer has pictorial access; they can 
become unrealistically familiar.) The females depicted in 
commercially posed scenes have straighter teeth and are 
slimmer, younger, taller, blonder, and "better" looking than 
those found in most real scenes, even most real scenes 
occurring in stylish settings, but certainly these figures are 
similar to the ones found in uncontrived, live scenes that 
occur in modeling agencies and other real places where 
mainly models foregather- which places, note, may not be 
luxuriously furnished. In contrast, the fact that women in 
American advertisements show no hair on their legs or under 
their arms can be taken to reflect directly the shaving 
28 Suggested in Milium (1975:142). 
29 See Chalfen (1975:96). Commercial movies can be shot in a 
studio containing hand-fashioned environments, or on an open studio 
lot, or in a geographical region that is similar in terrain to the real 
thing but closer to hand, or "on location" where the fictive events are 
purported to occur. But "real" in the last case must be used with care. 
Because mocked-up events are staged in these settings, often set in an 
epoch before or after the actual moviemaking, and because the 
ordinary traffic of people and events must be roped off during 
shooting, the realism provided by the setting can only serve to 
heighten the illusion, as when a con man manages to make use of a 
real banking office to hoodwink a mark. Reliance on such backdrops 
to establish life-likeness gives them a significance different from what 
they would ordinarily have, transforming them-as far as function is 
concerned-into quotations or symbols of themselves. 
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practice prevalent among women throughout America. (But 
the hairless legs and armpits displayed in French advertise-
ments cannot similarly be taken as evidence of appearances 
beyond the camera, for in F ranee, American depilatory 
practices so far have mostly influenced the commercially 
pictured world.) Finally, the general difference in hair 
styling, facial decoration, and clothing pattern that distin-
guishes male subjects from female subjects in American 
advertisements is by and large true of how males in all 
Westernized countries are distinguished from females both in 
posings for advertisements and in uncontrived scenes. To 
which must be added that what is common to commercial 
scenes and rare in life may yet be commonly part of the 
ideals and fantasies of many actual people. 
In sum, between commercially posed scenes and live ones 
there is every kind of carryover and almost every kind of 
discrepancy. Nor are matters in any way fixed. As soon as a 
formulaic feature of commercially choreographed scenes is 
uncovered and publicized, advertisers are in a position to 
self-consciously initiate a sharply contrary policy or to 
present guyed versions of the old. Withal, the art of analysis 
is to begin with a batch of pictures and end up with 
suggestions of unanticipated features of uncontrived scenes, 
or with representations of themes that are hard to write 
about but easy to picture, or with illustrations of novel 
differences between pictures and life. And throughout, I 
believe, the issue of exploration should be kept separate 
temporally from the issue of proof. Arrangements which 
hold for many live scenes (or many pictured ones) lie ready 
to be uncovered in one example, but not direct evidence 
concerning their actual distribution. 
X Finally, another look at the notion of a "scene," along with a review of the concept of commercial realism. 
Consider first the organizational constraints all scenes in 
advertisements might share and presuppose, and the liberties 
that can (but aren't necessarily) taken in their assembly; in 
short, consider the realm of being of which the drama in 
every individual ad is but an instance. 
It is easy to contrast what goes on in ads to what goes on 
in the real world and conclude- as commentators are 
wont- that advertisements present a dolled-up, affluent 
version of reality, but this does not tell us about the 
structure of advertising's world, that is, the way in which it is 
put together. So, too, it is easy to see commercial realism as 
constituting but another make-believe realm (along with the 
theater, cartoons, the novel, etc.) and to contrast all these 
merely fictive domains with reality; but however instructive, 
this comparison, I think, misses the point. For although such 
a contrast ought to be made, there is another that should 
proceed it. To explicate commercial realism one must start 
with the notion of "scene," whether live or fictive, and only 
after scenes have been contrasted to other ways of organizing 
understanding should, I think, one go on to contrast the 
commercially depicted variety in pictures to live, uncontrived 
ones. 
The term "scene" is itself not a particularly happy one. 
An actual view, or a picture of a view, of something that is 
relatively unchanging-like a forest or a skyline- is called a 
scene, as is any background or backdrop, however bustling, 
which a playwright or novelist might w~nt to set as the 
general context of his action. A segment of an act in a stage 
play (something an act may have anywhere from one to ten 
of, each offering continuous action in one place) is also 
called a scene. A quarrel between related persons, conducted 
in a manner sensed to be open by onlookers to whom the 
disputants are less related, is also called a scene. And there is 
a current vernacular use, referring to something that an 
individual might make, dig, or dislike. The scenes this paper 
has been concerned with are of a different order. 
In actual life as we wend our way through our day we pass 
into and out of immediate perception range of sequences of 
others; fleeting opportunity for viewing also occurs when 
they pass us. In metropolitan circu.mstances this means that 
we will be momentary onlookers of those whom we cannot 
identify biographically through name or appearance, that is, 
that we will catch glimpses of courses of action of strangers. 
Due to the warranted reputation of various behavioral 
settings and to the conventions of self-presentation, we will 
be able to infer something about the social identity (age, sex, 
race, class, etc.) of these strangers, their personal relationship 
to one another, their mood, and their current undertakings, 
these last, typically, only broadly categorized. 
The totality of viewings of the courses of action of 
strangers which we obtain throughout our days constitutes 
our glimpsed world. This is not quite an impersonal world, 
especially for sophisticated viewers. But it is a truncated one, 
and one in which almost everything can be located in broad 
categories only. It is ordinarily bereft of details concerning 
the lives of those who are witnessed in passing and bereft of 
their longitudinal point of view regarding what they are seen 
as being and doing. (We strangers do not see John and Mary 
comparison shopping for a broach to replace the one that 
was lost last wee·k at Jean's party, nor do we detect that their 
apparent dallying is due to their having to kill some time 
before going on to catch the new Fellini. That is what they 
see. We see a young middle-class couple looking at things in 
a jewelry store.) Observe, then, that to glimpse a world is not 
somehow to happen upon an intimate revealing drama that 
was not meant for us. Nor is it to obtain a somehow marred, 
distorted, fragmentary view of the whole, something that can 
be caused to snap back into its proper shape by the addition 
of new information or the exercise of interpretive skill. It is 
not as though we were cryptographers having to start with a 
partially deciphered text, able to take comfort in the 
prospect of eventual .success in unlocking what has all along 
been there. Or cardiologists interpreting the sounds of a 
stethescope for the character of a patient's diseasefT o 
glimpse a world rather is to employ a set of categories more 
or less distinctive to glimpsing and often entirely adequate 
for the job they are designect to do. Nor are these categories 
rough and undeveloped; indeed, the persons glimpsed are 
likely to be quite aware of precisely how they can be read, 
and will have as part of their concern to conform to 
anticipated displayings of themselves and to use these 
behavioral rubrics as a cover behind which to pursue all 
manner of unpublishable projects. Yet no amount of 
supplementary information of the kind we are likely to 
obtain is likely to bring us to the private view that the 
objects of our attention will themselves have of their own 
undertakings. To be sure, our passing views as strangers and 
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the sustained views of participants are not usually contradic-
tory, and rough correspondences could be worked out, but 
inevitably our concerns and theirs will be considerably 
different, as to a degree will be the world their conventional 
public behavior generates for us and the world they are in 
while moving from point to point under these ensigns. 
Now although there are real individuals whose glimpsed 
world is almost their only one, most of us I ive, and 
principally, in other worlds, ones having a longitudinal 
character, featuring extended courses of interlinked action 
and unique relationships to other people. Observe that a 
stage play or even a comic strip provides us with something 
quite beyond a glimpse of the lives (albeit fictional lives) of 
its characters; for we · are given considerable personal 
information about the protagonists and can link together 
various glimpsings of them, in consequence of which we can 
enter into their courses of action in more detail and with 
much more temporal depth than is ordinarily possible in the 
case of our real passing views of the lives of strangers. 
Commercial realism (along with certain cartoons and 
other drawings) provides, then, something of the same sort of 
realm as the one a stranger to everyone around him really 
lives in. The realm is full of meaningful viewings of others, 
but each view is truncated and abstract in the ways 
mentioned. 
And now having noted the significant similarity between 
live scenes and the ones pictured in advertisements, one can 
go on to properly locate the consideration already given of 
differences. To repeat: glimpses of real I ife (I ike caught 
photographs of it) provide us with models who are 
portraying themselves, whereas commercial realism does 
not-cartoons and other drawings may not even employ 
models. Yet there are ways in which commercial realism 
provides us something that is fuller and richer than real 
glimpses. First, ads (along with cartoons and other one-shot 
drawings) are intentionally choreographed to be un-
ambiguous about matters that uncontrived scenes might well 
be uninforming about to strangers. Second, scenes contrived 
for photographing (just as the ones drawn in comics) can be 
shot from any angle that the c~meraman chooses, the 
subjects themselves splayed out to allow an unobstructed 
view; these are two liberties that a person viewing a live scene 
cannot take. Finally, short of engaging in voyeuristic activity, 
a real person is very considerably restricted as to the sorts of 
live scenes he will be allowed to glimpse from whatever angle, 
for his presence in a place always requires social warrant. In 
advertised worlds, however, we can look in on almost 
everything. Observe that these dramaturgic advantages of 
commercial realism over real life, other fictional realms have 
also, along with some advantages that commercial realism 
lacks. 
A closing comment. The magical ability of the advertiser 
to use a few models and props to evoke a life-like scene of his 
own choosing is not primarily due to the art and technology 
of commercial photography; it is due primarily to those 
institutionalized arrangements in social life which allow 
strangers to glimpse the lives of persons they pass, and to the 
readiness of all of us to switch at any moment from dealing 
with the real world to participating in make-believe ones. 
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